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Abstract
In the light of the Spirit: the dual nature of the Third Person
Analogy with physical things and phenomena can be a useful tool in theo­
logy. In particular, the vestigia Trinitatis can be used to illustrate the doc­
trine of the Trinity, even if it is illegitimate to derive it from them. The 
phenomenon of light has frequently been suggested as a vestigium; in 
particular its dual nature as particle and wave can serve to illustrate how 
the Holy Spirit appears both to have the properties of a person, and also 
acts impersonally.
1. Introduction
Theology is full of problems which on the surface seem to present 
irreconcilable truths, and yet which on further reflection are amenable to 
a solution. Examples of these would be an affirmation of the validity of 
both infant and adult baptism (cf. Williams, 1987, 1995), or more pro­
foundly, the old chestnut of predestination and freewill (Williams, 1994). 
What is significant is that in both these cases, as others, it is possible to 
define each pole of the paradox such that both can be affirmed as valid 
simultaneously. The classic case of this is the idea of Trinity. On the 
surface it is impossible to affirm that God is one, yet recognize also the 
divinity of Jesus and also that of the Spirit along with that of the Father. 
Again, these seem contradictory, yet early Church history witnesses to 
the possibility of an intellectually satisfying way of affirming both sides of 
the paradox.
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Yet, even if this is done, there lurks a suspicion that what is being done is 
simply playing with words, so that there cannot be a reality behind them. 
It is quite possible to talk of a “square circle”, putting together two quite 
valid concepts, but knowing full well that the combination cannot possibly 
exist. Is the same being done with the Trinity?
Here the existence of physical realities which also appear to present 
mutually contradictory phenomena, requiring a search for a reconciling 
solution, is very significant for theology. Whereas it could be suggested 
that reconciling for example divine omniscience and human freewill, or 
the data on the Trinity, is a solution to an artificial problem, since there is 
no empirical evidence that anything real lies behind the problem, the 
case of physical realities, such as electrons and light, is subject to 
empirical investigation. This means that if the latter can be seen as a 
valid analogy, such as for the Holy Spirit, it does add to the evidence for 
the reality of the latter. Whereas apparently contradictory information 
about the Spirit may lead to a suspicion of actual nonexistence, evidence 
for his existence being seen as, for example, psychological phenomena, 
the existence of an analogy in the physical world weakens such a 
suspicion.
Particularly in the case of the Trinity, a number of physical similarities 
have been suggested, the vestigia Trinitatis, the reasoning being that the 
creator would have left some reflection of his nature in what was created. 
Such may not be valid as evidence for the existence of the Trinity, but 
may well be accepted as valid analogies, helping understanding of a 
difficult subject. Although it is not so commonly done, physical analogy is 
also used for other theological solutions; one example of this is the use 
of the nature of an electron as both wave and particle to illustrate the 
dual nature of Christ as divine and human in the incarnation (Bozack, 
1993:65-76). Such a procedure has a wide application; the following will 
concentrate on one aspect of the Trinitarian problem, whether the Spirit 
is personal or impersonal.
2. The vestigia Trinitatis
The basic idea is that if anyone is involved in making anything, it will 
reflect in some degree the nature of the one who makes it. Biblically, “his 
invisible nature has been clearly perceived in the things that have been 
made” (Rom. 1:20). Such are not in any sense divine, but by their nature 
indicate what God is like; smoke is not fire, but shows what fire is like, as 
it is caused by fire. Similarly, by looking at the style of writing, it is 
possible for an expert to deduce a considerable amount of information 
about the writer. Signatures are of course used in this way; they are 
totally individual to the signer.
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In this case, the Trinitarian nature of God should be seen in the world. 
Indeed, Bonaventure sees a Trinitarian unity in the whole created order; 
creation reflects God throughout (Santmire, 1985:100). Teilhard de 
Chardin sees creation as a replica of the Trinity (Fortman, 1982:289). 
Various specific examples of this have been suggested (cf. e.g. Bavinck,
1977:321 f). For example, water emerges from a spring, flows through a 
river to a lake. One substance of water occurs in three ways. A tree is all 
wood, but is comprised of trunk, roots and branches. Perhaps less 
crudely, there are three states of matter in solid, liquid and gas, all having 
the same substance, and there are three dimensions of length, breadth 
and height.
The classic example of the approach is found in Augustine’s de Trinitate, 
where he examines various possibilities. Not surprisingly, he looks for the 
Trinity in what he would see as the crown of creation, so in humanity, 
and then in what he would see as its superior element, so in the mind. 
He therefore suggests that the threefold nature of mind as memory, 
understanding and will is the best picture. Memory, essentially hidden, 
reflects the Father, active intelligence the Son, and love the Spirit. 
However, he concludes dissatisfied with his attempt.
The whole attempt to derive the Trinity in this way may be severely 
questioned. Augustine was working from a premise that the whole Trinity 
was involved in creation. His view is that the only difference between the 
Persons of the Trinity is in their internal relationships, and that every 
external act of God is then an undivided work of the entire Trinity; opera 
ad extra indivisa sunt. Just as the Trinity, the mind manifests as a unity, 
not revealing inner structure. It would then be invalid to see evidence of 
the Trinity in anything in which a structure could actually be observed. 
Such vestigia are then really impossible. Nevertheless, the Augustinian 
and Western standpoint has been criticized. It means that reason cannot 
be used to deduce the Trinity (Bavinck, 1977:328). It may well even be 
asked how, if external acts of God cannot be the works of distinct 
Persons, the Trinity can really be known at all (cf. Brown, 1985:285). 
More pertinently, since the Trinity is based on the Bible, this idea may be 
questioned Biblically, in that the Bible would appear to attribute specific 
acts to individual Persons. Thus, as in Colossians 1:16, it would seem 
that it was the Son only who was the agent of creation (cf. John. 1:10, 1 
Cor. 8:6). In fact it is usually the case that if the belief is that operations 
by God do not reflect the Trinity, then acts of God are “appropriated” to 
each Person. It may well be asked whether this is not little more than a 
convenience, and an avoidance of the plain understanding of the Bible. 
Jiingel (1976:36) even refers to it as a “hermeneutical procedure”. 
Surely, rather, what is revealed is genuine, and really shows the Trinity 
as it is, even if not necessarily completely.
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A second problem is that it is not certain in what way the Trinity is 
reflected in the world; it would seem to be fairly arbitrary. Thus although it 
may well be arguable to see reflections of the Trinity in humanity, and 
indeed this may well be suggested in the idea that humanity is imago Dei 
(the image of God) (Gen. 1:26), it is by no means clear how this should 
be applied. There has been continual discussion as to where, and in 
what way, the image of God is present in humanity (Clines, 1968:53­
103). Thus it may well be arguable that humanity reflects the spiritual 
nature of God, or that it is seen in the dominion over creation, and it has 
even been suggested (Clines, 1968:58) that this is seen in the physical 
form of people. Certainly it would not seem to be right to restrict attention 
to the mind or spirit. Osiander pointed out that the body is also part of the 
image of God (Moltmann, 1991:62). In this case it would seem to be right 
to see some vestigia in created things. What is clear is that great care 
must be taken; although people make coins and indeed something about 
the nature of people can therefore be deduced (e.g. technical ability, 
commercial activity and so on), this cannot be pressed. After all, people 
are not flat metal discs.
Related to this is that just about anything can be justified by this sort of 
analogy. Examples of threeness may be said to demonstrate the Trinity, 
but there are many examples of duality which, it could also be sugges­
ted, may indicate a binity. Humanity is in two sexes, an individual may be 
divided into two almost identical mirror images, and so on. Then the fact 
of four limbs in most animals could perhaps suggest a quaternity in God. 
It is even perhaps more logical to see the mind in terms of twoness than 
Augustine’s threeness (Brown, 1985:273). Indeed the use of the vestigia 
is likely to impose ideas of threeness on the Trinity which perhaps should 
not be there, as Augustine is accused of having done (Gunton, 1990:45).
In the light of such problems, it would seem to be illegitimate to try to 
deduce a doctrine of the Trinity in this way. The vestigia cannot be used 
to prove a Trinity. Nevertheless, it would not be illegitimate to seek to 
illustrate or to clarify the doctrine as deduced from the Bible, and this is 
what Augustine was trying to do (Bavinck, 1977:325). Aquinas wrote that 
"once the Trinity is given, analogical reason has its place” (Kelly, 1989: 
91). Jiingel (1976:12) in fact suggests that this use of analogy is 
indispensable. Thus once a doctrine has been accepted, it would then be 
valid to seek examples of that in creation, and such can well be found.
Karl Barth (1975:336f) devotes a considerable section of the first volume 
of his Church Dogmatics to the question of the vestigia Trinitatis. His 
view is well known, that no form of natural theology, a deduction about 
God from nature, is valid, and so for him, scripture is the only valid 
source for the idea of Trinity. Even illustration of revelation is wrong, as in
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Augustine; all that is permissible is to interpret it. His reason for this is 
that illustration is a short step from idolatry. The vestigia are even a 
hindrance as detracting from revelation. He has, however, referred to 
creation as a “temporal analogue, taking place outside of God, of that 
event in God himself by which God is Father of the Son", so a “created 
correspondence” to the Trinity (Barth, 1949:52). This analogy, however, 
emphatically depends on the prior recognition, from revelation, that God 
is the creator.
With his stress on the unity of God, Augustine is moving away from the 
Biblical portrayal. This is always the danger in the use of reason, and so 
behind Barth’s rejection of the vestigia. However, even if they do not give 
information about the Trinity in a reliable way, analogy is still absolutely 
essential. Even the picture of Father, Son and Spirit must be an analogy 
and so even this is not an accurate reflection of the nature of God. The 
very idea of the Trinity is in fact itself a vestigium, in logic (Barth, 1949: 
340), an attempt to describe in words, really to clarify, the actual revela­
tion. Different analogies are possible and reflect different aspects of God. 
Thus to cite an early example, the second Person was pictured as the 
“word", the logos of God, a picture with Biblical endorsement (John 1). 
This preserves aspects, such as expression, that “Son” does not. Other 
pictures are also possible, such as “wisdom”, a picture common in the 
Fathers, such as Tertullian (Fortman, 1982:110). Likewise the Spirit can 
be reflected by “wind”, “breath”, or itself “wisdom” (Gelpi, 1984:125). 
Wells (1995:331) points out that all the pictures were originally examples 
of contextualizing, seeking to describe the Trinity in categories under­
standable at the time. It then becomes essential, in a scientifically 
orientated world, to relate the Trinity to the ideas of modern science, and 
when done, conversation between the disciplines, which has been 
problematic in the past, is encouraged (Gunton, 1991:159).
3. The problem of the personality of the Spirit
It has often been remarked that whereas with the second Person of the 
Trinity, the Son, his personality is readily accepted while the question of 
his divinity has been hotly debated, with the Spirit, the third Person, the 
situation is reversed. This is perhaps understandable, since the 
experience of Jesus was always of a person clearly separate from his 
Father, but as human, it was hard to accept that he was also fully divine; 
on the other hand, the experience of the Spirit could easily be 
understood as that of God, but was not always accepted as that of a 
person. Of course, once the divinity of Christ was accepted, it was not 
difficult to accept a third divinity as well; indeed, apart from a few groups 
such as the Pneumatomachians of the fourth century (Bavinck, 1977: 
310), the divinity of the Spirit has never really been in doubt.
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But is the Spirit really a person, coequal with the Father and the Son in 
the Trinity, or is he (it?) the action or power of either the Father or the 
Son, or of both together, resulting in what amounts to a binity? Such 
could be the ancient understanding of the term, where persona was the 
mask through which an actor spoke (Moltmann, 1981:171). In contrast, 
the modern concept of a person has often been such as to stress 
discrete individuality, which has led to the rejection of the use of the term 
in respect of the Trinity by such as Barth or Rahner, who feel that it 
implies tritheism. However, what makes personality is not so much 
individuality, as a relationship to other persons (Gunton, 1991:164). In 
this case referring to the Spirit as a person means the possibility of a 
relationship with him that is distinct from that with the other Persons; he 
is then not just a way of speaking of the action of God.
In the early Christian centuries, when the doctrine of the Trinity was in 
the process of formulation, some people believe that ” ... orthodox 
theologians recognized ... that direct scriptural evidence for the deity of 
the Holy Spirit as a distinct hypostasis was hard to find” (Lampe, 1983: 
217). It may be suggested that the precise doctrine of the Spirit was 
actually strongly influenced by the development of the doctrine of the 
Son (Webster, 1983:4); this would include his personality.
There is in fact little real evidence in the post-Biblical writings of the early 
Church for belief in a Holy Spirit really distinct from Father and Son; 
indeed the full deity of the Spirit was not declared an article of belief until 
the council of Constantinople in 381 AD. Even then, Basil never referred 
to the Spirit as “God” or used the term homoousios, preferring homo- 
timos (of equal honour) or homodoxos (of equal glory). Could the early 
Church be seen as binitarian, as some believe (Mackey, 1983:135)? Is 
Trinitarian belief something that was dragged into orthodoxy in the 
development of belief concerning Father and Son, so a full statement of 
the personal divinity of the Spirit felt necessary to avoid a second kind of 
subordination after Arianism (Mackey, 1983:137), or is this real, and a 
true interpretation of the Bible?
What is very clear is that the Bible, whether in Old or New Testaments, 
regards the action of the Spirit as the action of God. It is often pointed 
out, for example, that when Annas and Sapphira lied to the Spirit, it was 
lying to God (Acts 5:3,4). More to the point here, however, it is possible 
to refer to the Spirit as divine insofar as acting for God, just as in Old 
Testament action the messenger could be regarded as having the 
authority of the one who sent him (Johnson, 1961:5), so would be seen 
as an extension of his personality. In this case the Spirit need not be 
viewed as personal.
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The full personality of the Spirit is suggested by texts which mention 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit together. Gregory of Nazianzus, Athanasius 
and Basil make their main appeal to the doxologies (Lampe, 1983:218). 
Specifically Matthew 28:19 and 2 Corinthians 13:14 place the three 
Persons together such that an equality and a separate identity of each 
would seem to be logical; neither however, demands this. In the story of 
Jesus’ baptism, both the voice of the Father and the appearance of the 
Spirit in bodily form as a dove were also observed. But was the Spirit 
simply the power of the Father? There are also texts such as 1 Peter 1:2, 
2 Thessalonians 2:13 and John 14:26, but these are all amenable to this 
form of binitarianism.
Wainwright (1962:248f) also notes considerable evidence for a triadic 
belief in the New Testament. Luke, hardly surprisingly due to his interest 
in the Spirit, both opens (Luk. 1:31-5) and closes (Luk. 24:49) his gospel 
by referring to all three Persons. Triadic reference is common in Paul, 
and the three most structured epistles, Romans, 1 Corinthians and 
Galatians, show evidence of a triadic structure based on Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, this does not prove that all three are coequal 
Persons, but on the contrary there are striking omissions, such as 
reference to the Spirit in re-creation in Revelation 21 and 22 and from 
Paul’s favourite greeting “from God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ’’ 
(Rom. 1:7 etc.).
In a sense, it is very natural to regard the Spirit as simply the activity of 
God the Father or of Christ. The very word, whether in English or in most 
other languages, suggests impersonality. Unlike the experience of Christ, 
the Spirit is always experienced in an impersonal way; there is no entity 
in clear distinction from the person in whom the Spirit is acting. Moltmann 
(1992:10) notes that the records of the experience of the Spirit use 
impersonal words. The baptism and filling with the Spirit almost demand 
impersonality, and even the phenomena at the day of Pentecost, the fire 
and the wind, are far from experiences of a person.
References such as Acts 2:4 are hard to reconcile with the personality of 
the Spirit. How can the disciples be filled with a person? They can be 
influenced by one, guided by one, even inspired by one, but filling is 
inappropriate. The same is true of “receiving” the Spirit (e.g. Acts 8:15) 
and other activities, notoriously being baptized in the Spirit (e.g. Acts 
11:16). The Pentecostal experience is not of meeting a person, but of 
being filled with power; this is true of the Acts 2 account and of Jesus’ 
enactment of the giving of the Spirit in John 20:21, where he breathed on 
the disciples. It is also noticeable that while the New Testament speaks 
of Jesus as receiving and accepting worship, and of invoking Jesus (e.g. 
Acts 7:59, Rev. 22:20), so effectively praying to him, a practice which
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certainly occurred in the early Church, yet this is never the case for the 
Spirit, which would be expected to be the case if he were a person in the 
same way as Christ.
There is likewise no compelling reason for personalization of the Spirit in 
the Old Testament. In both Testaments, the Spirit even lacks a personal 
distinction from God. Whereas the personal nature of both Father and 
Son is clear in that there is a two way relationship between them, there is 
no reciprocity in the interaction between Father and Spirit (Wainwright, 
1962:220).
Indeed it may well be argued that essentially the Spirit cannot be fully 
personal, for that would make him into a second Son. That has always 
had to be avoided, firstly by careful definition of the origin of the Spirit; in 
the East this was said to be through the Son, and in the West from 
Father and Son. Secondly, in contrast to the “generation” of the Son, the 
Spirit was said to “proceed”.
Yet, classical Christian theology insists that the Spirit is indeed a person. 
Firstly the word itself does not demand impersonality, as there are such 
things as spirits which would seem to have separate, personal identity; 
1 Kings 22:21 describes one of these in apparently personal terms. 
Secondly, despite the fact that “spirit” in Greek is a neuter word, so 
suggesting impersonality, some passages in John, such as 16:13, quite 
clearly refer to the Spirit by means of a masculine pronoun. Moreover, 
and perhaps an explanation of these, John refers to Jesus’ promise to 
send another advocate, a comforter. Now the word for this, parakletos, 
has a masculine form, and in any case Jesus refers to the sending of 
another, so distinct from himself, so if he is personal it is a reasonable 
inference that so is the coming one. This is the same argument as that 
from the equality of the Persons; as Father and Son are personal, so is 
the Spirit (Gelpi, 1984:117). However, personality is surely not a feature 
of essence, but a relation or attribute. It must, however, be noted that 
elsewhere in John, for example in John 14:17, neuter pronouns are used 
in reference to the Spirit, and where a masculine pronoun is used 
elsewhere, as in John 16:7, its gender is governed by that of parakletos. 
It must incidentally be noted here that, despite the apparent 
impersonality of the Spirit in the Old Testament, the word is linguistically 
feminine; Hebrew, however, lacks a neuter. At the same time, in Latin, 
spiritus is masculine, and so implies personality; such could perhaps 
have influenced Latin theology.
The third reason for seeing the Spirit as personal is the main one. It is 
argued that very frequently the action attributed to the Spirit is that of a 
person. He teaches (John 14:26), convinces (John 16:8), guides (John
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16:13), speaks (Acts 8:29), calls (Acts 13:2) forbids (Acts 16:6), 
intercedes (Rom. 8:26) and so on. He can be lied to (Acts 5:3), tempted 
(Acts 5:9), resisted (Acts 7:51), grieved (Eph. 4:30), and blasphemed 
(Mat. 12:31, a text that particularly indicates a real distinction from the 
Son). Olyott (1979:49) also suggests that there are a number of texts 
(Acts 15:28; Mat. 28:19; Luk. 14:14; Acts 10:38; Rom. 15:13; 1 Cor. 2:4) 
which become meaningless if “Spirit” were replaced by “power”, 
particularly in the case such as 1 Corinthians 2:4 “in demonstration of the 
Spirit and power”. On the other hand, just as the link with the first two 
Persons can suggest personality, so this can suggest impersonality.
Personal and impersonal; there are valid arguments for each. The 
preceding is by no means exhaustive. But is this a contradiction? Is it 
necessary to choose? On the contrary, it would seem that it is necessary 
to affirm both aspects and to seek to understand how these can both be 
true.
4. The analogy of light
It is here that the use of the vestigia, of analogy, comes into play, for 
there is indeed a very similar situation existing in nature to that of the 
Holy Spirit. The understanding of the nature of light provides a similar 
paradox, and so, by analogy, provides a suggestion as to the nature of 
the Spirit. Light presents a duality between wave and particle which is 
analogous to the Spirit acting in both a personal and an impersonal way. 
The essence of the physical paradox is that in some circumstances, light 
behaves as an electromagnetic wave, exhibiting similar phenomenon to 
other radiations in the spectrum, but of specific frequencies and corres­
ponding wavelengths. The wave nature is seen clearly in such 
phenomena as refraction, diffusion and particularly interference, demon­
strated by experiments such as Young’s (Haken, 1981:41). On the other 
hand, light also behaves in such a way as would be explained by seeing 
it as discrete elements, almost particles, known as “photons”. Again there 
is a well accepted set of evidence to support this, in particular the 
photoelectric effect and the Compton effect (Haken, 1981:57). Now such 
evidence is, at least on the surface, mutually contradictory; a single entity 
cannot behave as a wave and also as a particle. Nevertheless, there 
must be a way to explain how both sets of data are simultaneously 
applicable to a single thing. As regards light, this is indeed the case, and 
done through the quantum theory.
The choice of light as an analogy for the Spirit is not arbitrary. The Bible 
does contain a number of analogies to the Spirit. Wind or breath is 
common, and is reflected in that a common word is used in Greek, 
Hebrew and in many other languages. Yet this does not exhaust the
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possibilities. Oil and water come naturally to mind, the former due to its 
use in anointing (Ex. 29:7) and in healing (Jas. 5:14), the latter because 
of baptism and in drinking (John 7:38). Fire is another possibility, which 
along with wind symbolized the descent of the Spirit on the day of 
Pentecost (Acts 2:3). Both evoke the idea of power, which is central to 
the work of the Spirit. It is a very small step from the analogy of fire to 
that of light; in the ancient world, fire was the only practicable source of 
light. Moltmann, with his view of the universal influence of the Spirit 
(although John 14:17 notes that the world cannot receive him or know 
him), is naturally attracted by the analogy. He comments that the use of 
light as a metaphor for God is ages old (Moltmann, 1992:281). Certainly 
it is an Old Testament picture, as in Psalm 27:1 and Micah 7:8. It is not 
surprising that it was early used as analogous for the Trinity by Tertullian. 
Specifically, light has commonly been used as an analogy for the Spirit, 
such as by several fourth century Fathers, notably Basil and Gregory of 
Nazianzus. They were attracted to the picture as they perceived an 
equality of emitter and emitted. In the Bible, Revelation 4:5 equates the 
torches of fire round the throne of God with the “seven spirits of God”. A 
striking case is the brightness of Moses’ face (Ex. 32:30; 2 Cor. 3:7 f.). 
Although the giving of the law is contrasted with the dispensation of the 
Spirit, the inference is that the experience of Moses was caused by that 
same Spirit (2 Cor. 3:16-7).
Many of the references to light as a symbol for life can also be seen as 
applying to the Spirit, such as 1 Thessalonians 5:5, referring to Christians 
as children of light. Light is a means by which we see; it is also a means 
of transferring energy from the transmitter, energy which is detected by 
the eye in sight. It may also, therefore, quite significantly, be a means of 
communication, for the waves may be modified in amplitude or frequency 
in accordance with the message being communicated. This is a 
reasonable analogy for the Spirit, who helps Christians to understand 
spiritual truth (John 16:13), to be “enlightened”, and also is the means by 
which the power of God becomes available (Acts 1:8). From a Trinitarian 
perspective, it is perhaps no accident that we perceive things mainly by 
two senses, hearing and sight. While the former can refer to the Word, 
the second Person, the latter can refer to the third, the Spirit. It is by 
these that we know what we do of God.
Physically, light is produced without a diminution of the substance of the 
source (although it does require energy). This is very different from the 
birth of a son, which is due to a change in the parents. It is for this reason 
that in the case of the Trinity, the Son is defined, following Origen, as 
coming by an eternal generation, so without change in God. The meta­
phor of light does not suffer from this problem, so again can fittingly be
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used as an analogy for the Spirit. Light is emitted as a process, and the 
Spirit eternally proceeds.
Moreover, just as spirit is almost by definition immaterial, so light likewise 
is immaterial and requires no material medium for its transmission. When 
the wave nature of light was originally investigated, it was supposed that 
there was such a thing as a “lumeniferous ether” which pervaded the 
universe and was the means by which light travelled as an oscillation in 
that medium. Later research, however, clearly demonstrated that the 
speed of light was a constant, irrespective of the direction of travel, 
indicating that such an ether did not exist. It may incidentally be noted 
that the speed of light is one of the physical absolutes, as it can never be 
exceeded. The action of the Spirit likewise provides an absolute in a 
world which is taken up with relative assessment of such as moral 
values.
The danger with any analogy is that it can be pressed too far, but it could 
perhaps be noted that there are seven colours in the visible spectrum, 
and enigmatic references to the seven spirits of God (e.g. Rev. 1:4, 5:6). 
It is also the case that whereas light does not harm (except to the eye if 
too bright), other parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as gamma 
rays, are less benign. Evil spirits also exist.
Specifically, the dual nature of light as both a wave motion and particle 
can provide some help in understanding how the Spirit can be simul­
taneously personal and impersonal. Whereas a wave is very much an 
action of its source, so is “impersonal”, a particle is not affected by it 
once it has been emitted, so relates to what it falls upon in a “personal” 
way, independent of the source.
On the one hand, one side of the nature of light is its particular nature, 
seeing that it comprises discrete and separate photons. These are 
particles with a distinct identity from each other, such particular nature 
being seen in that they even have a distinct spin, something impossible 
for a wave motion. Although they come from one source, they act 
independently of that source. Incidentally, electrons also behave as 
particles with spin, have a mass, and also exhibit the characteristics of a 
wave. An individual photon will then have an effect on one particular 
atom, and on no others; this can be viewed as analogous to the action of 
the Spirit who guides and speaks to Christians as individuals, so to one 
in one way, to another in a different way, and gives gifts to Christians on 
a totally individual basis (1 Cor. 12:7 f ). Such unpredictability is evi­
denced physically at the subatomic level. The Heisenberg Uncertainty 
principle is that it is impossible to know everything about an electron or a 
photon, as the very attempt to measure position or speed inevitably
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changes them in an unpredictable way. Such a vestigium thus includes 
the idea of freedom, so characteristic of God, an aspect usually absent 
from other analogies.
It is at an atomic level that the particular nature of light is evident, and on 
the individual level that the Spirit is seen as a person. The difference is 
that whereas a single photon is very small and with little power, the 
action of the Spirit on an individual is by no means small, but because 
God is infinite, the experience of the Spirit is that of God, and not a part 
of him.
In distinction from this, light is seen as a wave on the supra-atomic level, 
so is our normal experience. Here, the wave nature of light provides a 
reasonable analogue for the impersonal action of the Spirit. Rooms or 
other spaces may be filled with light, objects may reflect, absorb and 
retransmit it. Growth, especially in plants, is dependent on it. The 
pictures of a Christian being filled with the Spirit (Eph. 5:18), being bap­
tized, and even producing the fruit of the Spirit (Gal. 5:22) show a 
similarity to this. Waves by their nature as a process cannot be localized 
as can a material object (Bozack, 1993:73). The omnipresence of God 
(e.g. Ps. 139) can readily be pictured as analogous to the pervasiveness 
of light. On the other hand, light can also be intensely localised, as in the 
case of lasers; the Spirit’s action can be very specific. God acts on 
individuals, and in our individualistic society we tend to assume that that 
is all, but there is surely a place to see the action of God in society, even 
in churches, in a less personal way. Would it be valid to see this in terms 
of a Christianization of society, the adherence to Christian norms and 
standards by groups as a whole? Such may be present even where the 
majority deny personal faith; God does restrain wickedness, at least to 
some degree (2 Thess. 2:6). On the other hand, it may tragically be 
absent in a group even where most claim to be Christian.
There is no question of light or electrons changing from one form to 
another, but they always have both sets of characteristics. A given 
situation will emphasize one aspect (Bozack, 1993:73), but the other will 
still be present. All that can be said is that one will tend to predominate. 
Thus in the case of light, it may be treated simply as a wave, whereas an 
electron may usually be seen as a particle. Perhaps the same is true of 
the Spirit, who may be generally seen in a more impersonal manner, but 
in some circumstances is clearly personal. Both are Biblical; the only 
question is which is fundamental. In fact the same is true of human 
beings, who are considered as persons, but who may also act in a 
distinctly impersonal way. People may simply provide labour, and in that 
situation have no element of individuality or of choice, yet in a normal 
situation the prevalence is of both over impersonal activity. The same is
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even true of Jesus, who was clearly experienced as a person. Salvation 
is achieved for the Christian in an intensely personal way insofar as the 
giving of eternal life is through a personal relationship with Christ, a union 
with him (Rom. 6:4). Yet the other side of the process of salvation, the 
atonement for sin through the sacrifice on the cross can perhaps better 
be seen as impersonal insofar as he died for the sins of the whole world 
(1 John 2:2).
Thus all, people, light, and so also the Spirit, exhibit both personal and 
impersonal characteristics; the most that can be said is that there is an 
emphasis on one aspect or another, depending on the situation. Such an 
emphasis is particularly clear in the nature of light as wave or photon and 
is evidenced in other elements which also have such a duality. 
Commenting on this duality, Ditchburn (1976:700) writes “... the limiting 
theory for matter is a particle theory, and the limiting theory for radiation 
is a wave theory”.
If this suggestion is correct, it does not involve any reformulation of the 
traditional statement of the Trinity; there is no reason to deny that the 
Spirit is personal, indeed Biblical evidence supports this. However, there 
is here an accommodation to the fact that the action of the Spirit can be, 
and even is usually, impersonal. What must be emphasized is that the 
desire is to understand the relevant material for the Trinity, and in this 
case, the personality of the Spirit, in a way more consistent with the 
Biblical material.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, it might just be observed that the behaviour of light is 
influenced by the nature of the physical situation. It is bent when passing 
between air and glass, or may be reflected, dimmed or even totally 
excluded. In his omnipotence and freedom as God, the action of the 
Spirit likewise relates to the situation in the world or the Church. The 
Spirit may be quenched (1 Thess. 5:19), so his light withheld, but more 
positively, may be more evident in churches that seek to experience him, 
or in a society where people long and pray for revival. Optical 
instruments have to be made with great care and precision if the light is 
to do what is intended, and perhaps the lesson for the Christian Church, 
both as a group and as individuals, is that we too need to take our 
Christian faith and activity much more seriously if we are to see the 
workings of the Spirit in a way which we desire.
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